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RECENT CASES.
AD.117RALTY-TI1E TiTANC-LIMITATION OF Li.D-mia-The owners of the
Titanic filed a petition in the circuit court for a limitation of their liability
under the laws of the United States (U. S. Comp. Stat., 190T, pp. 2943-4)
and Admiralty Rules S4 and 56. Such laws limit the liability to "the interest
of such owner in such vessel and her freight then pending.' This amounted
to the value of iome fourteen life-boats. On the ground that the Titanic
was a British registered vessel lost on the high seas not within the terri-
torial waters of the United States, it was contended that the law of Great
Britain would apply and not that of this country. Hcld: The owners of the
Titanic can maintain proceedings in the courts of the United States and said
courts will apply the limited liability laws of the United States and not
the law of Great Britain. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Mellor, 34 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 754 (1914).
The general proposition that foreign ships may resort to the courts of
the United States for limitation of liability under Rev. Stat. §4283 has been
established where collisions have taken place between an American and a
foreign vessel, The Scotland, ioS U. S. 24 (1881), and between two foreign
vessels, La Bourgoyne. 210 U. S. 95 (907). But see dictum of Bradley, .,
in The Scotland, supra, that if two vessels belonging to the same nation
were involved, the court would decide the case under the law of the ship's
flag. At first instance it. would seem that the court had gone to an unneces-
sary extreme in applying the law of the United States to the principal case.
Fundamentally the law of a nation has no extraterritorial effect, and where a
single foreign vessel alone is involved, the necessity of a neutral court is not
apparent as where vessels of different nations have collided. With rare
exception, the liability in tort between parties is fixed by tht. law of the
jurisdiction within which the wrong is done-i. e., England in the case of the
Titanic. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347 (19o9).
Yet the laws of the fora, may refuse to enforce this foreign law if it
conflicts with domestic laws. This Congress has done in limiting recovery in
the case of loss of lives aid cargoes on the high seas, U. S. Comp. Stat., 19o,
supra. On this then, the court has based its decision, contending that it is
in accord with its former decisions and refusing to apply the undoubted logic
in Mr. Justice Bradley's diclum.
The Titanic case has likewise been adjudicated in England. Ryan v.
Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., iio Law Times, 641 (1914). In Great
Britain the liability of ship-owners is arranged according to the tonnage of
the ship. Merchants' Shipping Act, i8g4, §503. It was held that the clause
on the ticket exempting the company from liability for negligent navigation
was inconsistent with the passenger's contract as sanctioned by the Board of
Trade under the Merchants' Shipping Act, supra. -
CRMI.AL LAw-Am rmE. SuIciDE-An attempt to commit suicide is an
attempt to commit felony, and within the provision of the Hard Labour Act,
1822, that, on an indictment for "an attempt to commit felony," the court
has power to inflict a sentence of imprisonment with hard labor. Rex. v.
Mann, IIo Law Times, 781 (1914).
By the common law of England, suicide was a felony, punishable by for-
feiture of the goods and chattels of the suicide and an ignominious burial.
4 Bl. Com. i89, 19o; Hales v. Petit, Plowd. 253, 26z (1563). So also an
attempt to commit suicide was indictable as a misdemeanor in England. Reg.
v. Doody, 6 Cox C. C. 463 (1854); Reg. v. Burgess, 9 Cox C. C. 247 (1862).
In America. very few cases have arisen involving attempted suicide, and the
decisions have been somewhat affected by statutes. In New Jersey, under a
statute which makes all offences of an indictable nature at common law, and
not otherwise provided for by act of the legislature, misdemeanors, an
attempt at suicide was held to be a misdemeanor. State v. Corney, 69 N. J.
(133)
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L. 478 (19o3). In New York, North Dakota, and South Dakota, the PenalCode, while providing that suicide is not a crime, also provides that onewho attempts suicide is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment. PenalCode of New York, §§2, 173, 174, 178. However, there are no reportedconvictions for this offence in any one of the three states. In Massachusettsand Maine, since, by statute, the degree of punishment for attempts to com-mit offences is measured by the punishment prescribed for each offence, ifactually committed, and -no punishment is prescribed for suicide, it was heldthat an attempt to commit suicide was not indictable. Com. v. Dennis, iosMass. 162 (187o); May v. Pennell, ii Me. 516 (x1o6). See also King v.Ahsee (Hawaii), 2 Am. Law Rev. 794 (1867). In Pennsylvania, forfeiturefor suicide having been abolished, it was held that, since there was no pun-ishment, there was no crime, and that, as an accomplished suicide was not acrime, an attempt to commit suicide was not a crime, in the absence of astatute making it such. Com. v. Wright, II Pa. Dist. Rep. 144 (1902).Although it is everywhere recognized the suicide was a felony at com-mon law, it has been a mooted question whether suicide was murder or adistinct felony. See 3 COL. L R. 379 and 59 U. OF P. L. R. io6, where theconclusion reached is that suicide is murder at common law. Even in thosestates in which suicide is held not to be a crime, one who counsels or aidsanother to kill himself and is present when he does so, is guilty of murderas a principal in the second degree. Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146(1872); Com. v. Mink. 123 Mass. 422 (1877). In Texas, where suicide isnot a crime, it was held that one who furnished the means for or counselledsuicide, was guilty of no crime. Grace v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 193(1902); Sanders v. State, 112 S. W. Rep. 68 (Tex. i9o8). Thege cases standalone among the reported decisions, but their reasoning would seem to be
logically irrebuttable.
CRIMINAL LAW-FALSE PRETENCES-WORHLESS CHEQUE-The mere actof giving a cheque on a bank in which the maker has no account will supportan indictment for obtaining money by false pretense if there is proof thatthe maker had no reasonable grounds to believe that the cheque would bepaid upon presentation." State v. Foxton, 147 N. W. Rep. 347 (Iowa, 1914).The authorities are somewhat in conflict as to whether, under the uni-versal statutes which prevail, a worthless cheque is a false pretense or token.It is well settled that where the cheque is accompanied by a false statementthat the maker has funds in the bank to meet it, a conviction will be sus-tained. Foote v. People, i 7un i218 (N. Y. 1879); Taylor v. Wise, 126N. W. Rep. 1i26 (Iowa, i9ro). The majority of jurisdictions hold that themere act of giving a cheque on a bank is a representation that the makerhas at the time money or credit in the'bank, and if, when the cheque isgiven, the drawer has no funds in the bank and knows the cheque will notbe paid upon presentation, this is considered a false pretense. Re ina v.Jackson, 3 Campbell, 370 (Eng. 1813); People v. Wasservogle, 77 Cal. 173(1888) ; Barton v. People, 135 Ill. 405 (i89o); State v. Hamelsy, 52 Or. i56(19o8) ; 2 Bishop. Cr. Law, §430; 2 Whrton Cr. Law (9th ed.), §hI7o. But
if one who has an account at a bank gives a cheque against it, though he hasno funds on deposit at the time, this alone will not support a conviction,since the cheque might be paid upon presentation and an intent to defraudis not necessarily implied. There must be proof that the cheque is notmerely an "overdraft." This is held in the principal case. Regina v. Hazel-ton, 23 AV. Rep. 139 (Eng. 187*5). But some courts refuse to consider thegiving of a worthless cheque sufficient to constitute a false pretense, eventhough the maker knows it will not be paid. These courts require someactual affirmative representation as to its validity and worth. Blackwell v.State, 41 Tex. Cr. Reps. io4 (1899) ; Moxey v. State, 85 Ark. 499 (1908).
CRIMINAL LAW-PERJURY-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENE- The defendant, abankrupt, was convicted of having made a false oath in a bankruptcy pro-ceeding, in violation of Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, §29, b. (2). Held:
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This offense is not of equal enormity with perjury, and the ancient rule
of the common law requiring two witnesses to convict of perjury has been
practically annulled. Kahn v. United States, 214 Fed. Rep. .4 (1914).
The old common law rule was that, to support a conviction for perjury,
the evidence of two "direct" witnesses was required to establish the falsity
of the oath on which the indictment was based. 4 Bl. Com. 358; 4 Hawk.
P. C.. b. 2. c. 46. §io. The reason for this rule can be found in the then
current distinction between "circumstantial" and "direct" evidence. Whart.
Crim. Ev., §387. But since all testimony is now considered more or less
circumstantial, it has become well settled that a conviction may be had on
the evidence of one witness, supported by proof of corroborating circum-
stances. Williams v. Com., 9z Pa. 493 (i879); State v. Faulkner, 175 Mo.
546 (1903). Some cases hold that the corroborative evidence necessary
must be equivalent to the testimony of another witness. Gaudy v. State,
23 Neb. 436 (1888). But the general rule seemns to be that the corrobora-
tive evidence is not required to equal in weight the testimony of another
witness. United States v. 'Wood, 39 U. S. 430 (i84o). However, in all cases,
316 (i9o4). Admissions of the accused are not sufficient corroborative evi-
dence. Peterson v. State, 74 Ala. 34 (1883); State v. Hunter, Jupra. But
see contra, State v. Blize, III Mo. 464 (1892).
While the rule of the majority of jurisdictions is as stated above, there
are a few decisions which depart still further from the old common law
rule. It has been held that evidence by one witness only of contradictory
oaths of the defendant is sufficient for conviction. Rex v. Knill, 5 Barn. &
Old. 929 note (1822). In West Virginip, it was held that the mere uncor-
roborated contradictory evidence of the prosectiting witness was sufficient,
where the jury 'had opportunity to observe the defendant's demeanor while
testifying in his own behalf. State v. Miller, 24 W. Va. 8o2 (1884). Where
the icontradiction came directly from the defendant by means of written
testimony, a conviction for perjury was obtained without the aid of a living
witness. United States p. Wood, 39 U. S. 43o (i84o). However, in all cases,
the falsity of the defendant's oath must be established by a preponderance of
evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Courtright, 66 Ohio St. 35
(192).
CONTRACTS--PARTIAL PEMRoRMANCE-IMPOSS1131LITY OF C PLmON-A
sub-contractor agreed to construct a viaduct according to specifications fur-
nished by the city engineer, the work to be paid for from time to time accord-
ing to estimates. When partly finished the structure collapsed because of
defects in the specifications. The sub-contractor sued for value of work done
and profits he would have "realized on completed contract. Held: He may
recover for value of work done, but not for profits. Huetter v. Ware-house and Realty Co., 142 Pac. Rep. 675 (Wash. x9r4). -
The general principle to be regarded in cases of impossibility of per-
formance of contracts is, that when the contract is entire and for a lump
sim the loss falls on the builder. Adams v. Nichols, 36 Mass. 279 (1837);
Tompkins v. Dudley, 25 N. Y. 272 (1862). but where the amount is pay-
able in instalments, Milske v. Steiner Mantel Co., 5 L R. A. io5 (Md. 19o6),
nr where contract is to perform a particular part of a larger undertaking,
recovery can be had for the part performed. Hayes v. Gross, 57 N. E. Rt ,
1]12 (N. Y. i896); Elliott on Contracts, Vol. 3, §19O9. Where the impossi-
bility of performance arises out of defects in specifications furnished either
by the one letting the contract or third person, decisions are not uniform
as to whether the contractor may recover for the part performed. The
decision in such cases depends upon whether or not the court takes the view
that the person furni'hing the specifications warrants to the contractor
that the specifications, when followed out, will produce the result con-
tracted for. in England and in some American jurisdictions it is held that
there is no such implied warranty and that the contractor cannot recover.
Thorn v. Mayor of London, L. R. [1876] 1 App. Cas. x2o; Lonergan v. Loan
Assn., io4 S. W. Rep. xo6x (Tex. i9o7). The prevailing American view,
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in accord with the principal case, is that if the work is faithfully performed
in accordance with the specifications furnished, tlhe contractor may recover
even if the result contracted for is not obtained thereby. MacKnight Flintic
Stone Co. v. Mayor. i6o N. Y. 72 (1899); City of N. Y. v. Pa. Steel Co.,
-o6 Fed. Rep. 455 (1913) ; Bush v. Jones, 6 L. R. A. 778 (U. S. x9o6); Miller
& Sons v. Homeopathic Hospital, 243 Pa. 502 (1914).
CONTRACTS-PROMISE TO PAY DEBT OF ANOTIFR-The defendant con-
tracted with a third person to pay the latter's debt to the plaintiff. No assets,
however, were placed in the defendant's hands for paying that indebtedness.
ttcld: The plaintiff cannot sue upon the contract. Sweeney v. Houston, go
Atl. Rep. 347 (Pa. 1914).
This case affirms the Pennsylvania doctrine, that an agreement to pay
the debt of the promisee can be enforced by the creditor only when money
or property was placed in the promisor's hands for the purpose of paying
the creditor. Delp v. Brewing Co., 123 Pa. 42 (1888); Howes v. Scott, 224
Pa. 7 (I909). But see contra, Claflin v. Ostrom, 54 N. Y. 581 (1874); Lebow
v. Simonton, 3 Colo. 346 (1877); Shamp v. Meyer, 2o Neb. 223 (1886).
By the common law rule, no one could enforce a contract who was not
a party thereto. Price v. Easton, 4 B. & Ad. 333 (Eng. 1833); Morgan v.
Randolph-Clowes Co., 73 Conn. 396 (xgoo); Borden v. Boardman, i57 Mass.
410 (1892). But in most of the American states a person may acquire
rights under a contract to which he is not a party. Kehoe v. Patton, 23
R. 1. 36o (goi) ; Bassett v. Hughes, 43 Wis. 319 (1877); Stein v. Deutsch,
178 111. App. 615 (1913) ; First National Bank v. Doherty, 156 Ky. 386 (1913).
The cases fall into two groups: those in which the plaintiff is the sole bene-
ficiary of the contract, and those in which the contract is for the purpose
of discharging some legal obligation of the promisee to the plaintiff. If a
case does not come within either of these two, classes, a stranger to the
contract cannot sue upon it, even though he might be benefited by the per-
formance of the contract. Davis v. Clinton Co., 54 Ia. 59 (i88o); Crandall
v. Payne, 154 Ill. 627 (i8g5); .Gate City Bank v. Chick, 170 Mo. App. 343
(1913). For further discussion of the subject see 6z U. OF P. L. R. 67, and
6a U. or P. L. R. 53 (Nov. '914).
CoNsTrTUIONAL LAw-E ENIcs MARRIAGE LAW-POLICE PowE-A Wis-
consin statute provides that every male person on applying for a marriage
lisence, must file with the county clerk a physician's certificate that he is free
from any acquired venereal disease. Wis. -St., 1913, c. 738. Held: This act
is constitutional. Peterson v. Widule, 147 N. W. 966 (1914).
The much talked of eugenics marriage law is here held constitutional as
proper means of regulating the marriage relationship. It is upheld under the
police power of the state. "The police power of a state is co-extensive with
self-protection. It is that inherent and plenary power in the state, which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort and welfare of
society." Lakeview v. Rose Hill Cemetery, 70 Ill. 192 0873); Tiedeman on
Police Power, §749. The right of a state to regulate marriage by legislative
enactment has been universally acknowledged and rarely disputed. The
State v. Walker, 36 Kan. 297 (1887). States have forbidden intermarriage
between persons within certain degrees of consanguinity. So statutes have
been held constitutional which forbid the intermarriage between whites and
blacks, Green v. The State, 58 Ala. "9o (1877); The State v. Jackson, 8o
Mo. 175 (1883) ; and between an epileptic and another. Gould v. Gould, 78
Conn. 242 (i9o5).
In the principal case the decision was not unanimous, two judges dis-
senting on the.ground that the statute was an infringement of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and of similar provisions in the
state constitution.
CONTRACTS-WAIVER OF DEFENCE OF STATUTE OF LISI1TATIONs--PuBLIC
POLIc Y-A clause in a promissory pote expressly waiving all rights and benc-
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fits conferred by the statute of limitations is not against public policy.
Parchen v. Chessman, 142 Pac. Rep. 63 (Mon. 1914).
The decisions are at variance in regard to the policy of the law with
respect to agreements not to plead the statute of limitations. Some juris-
dictions look upon the statute as a mere personal privilege which the defend-
ant may or may not plead as he chooses, and these courts uphold agree-
ments to waive the bar. Some cases are based on the gr6und of estoppel
and some upon the force of the contract itself. State Trust Co. v. Sheldon,
68 Vt. 259 (i895); Quick v. Corlies, 39 N. J. L. ii (1876) ; State Loan and
Trust Co. v. Cochran, i3o Cal. 245 (10oo). Other courts regard the statute
as a law established for public benefit, and hence not subject to contraven-
tion by private agreement.. Under this view, all such contracts to waive the
statute, are void as against public policy. Crane v. French, 38 Miss. 503
(i86o); Shapley v. Abbott, 42 N. Y. 443 (1870); Smith v. Gillette 59 Texas,
86 (1883); Mills v. Bennett, 94 Tenn. 65x (1895); Union Life Ins. Co. v.
Spinks, ii9 Ky. 26i (igo4). But in some of these jurisdictions an agree-
ment limiting the time within Which an action may be brought to a period
less than that provided by the statute is held valid. Smith v. Herd, 11o Ky.
56 (i9o); Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 7 Wall. 386 (U. S. x868).
Some courts express doubt as to the validity of an agreement to waive the
statute for an indefinite period, but uphold contracts to forego the right
for a specified time. Wells, Fargo and Co. v. Enright. 127 Cal. 669 (19oo).
What is the public policy of a state depends, not upon the private convic-
tions of the judges, but upon statutes, and in the absence of legislation, upon
the decisions of the courts. Vidal v. Girard's Executors, et al., 2 How. 127
(U. S. i844); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U. S. 2.o
O8W).
DAMAGES-MENTAL SUFFERING-DELAY IN TRANsMissxox oF MESSAGE-
By reason of the negligence of a telegraph company. a message, informing a
parent of his child's dying condition, was not delivered until after the
funeral. Held: Where the only injury resulting from negligent delay in the
transmission of a telegram is mental suffering, damages are not recoverable.
Corcoran v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., i42 Pac. Rep. 29 (Wash. 1914).
The decision in this case is in strict harmony with the rule in the great
majority of jurisdictions. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Ferguson, 157 Ind. 64
(19o); Connell v. Western Union Tel. Co., i6 Mo. 34 (1893); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Burris, 179 Fed. Rep. 92 (igio). The doctrine governing
these decisions rests partly on the ground that it is difficult to ascertain the
truth in cases of mental pain and anxiety, Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. Rogers, 68 Miss. 748 (i89i), and partly on the ground that mental anguish
is largely a matter of individual temperament and susceptibility. Francis v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 58 Minn. 252 (1894); Kester v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 55 Fed. Rep. 6o3 (1893). But Texas,' in x88r, promulgated a doctrine,
contra to the rule of the principal case, holding telegraph companies liable
for mental suffering, caused by the delay in the transmission of messages
relating to sickness or death. So Relle v. Western Union Tel.Co., 55 Tex.
308 (88i). This decision has been followed by the courts of a number of
jurisdictions. Middleton v. Western Union Tel. Co, 62 So. Rep. 744 (Ala.
1913); Maley v. Western Union Tel. Co., 13o N. W. Rep. Io86 (Ia. i91i);
Chapman v. Western Union Tel. Co., go Ky. 265 (i8go). For a full treatment
of the "Texas doctrine," its basis and application, see the article "Liability of
Telegraph Companies," in 42 Am. LAw REG. (N. S.) 715.
EviDENcE-ADMissiiLrrY-1HosPITAL REcolws-In order to show that the
plaintiff, who was suing for personal injuries, had aggravated his condition
by misconduct at a hospital, the defendant offered in evidence a hospital
record which was required to be made up every three days by an interne
who based the entries partly on his own information and partly on the
reports of other attendants. The latter 'testified in court, but the interne
was at the time out of the ju:isdiction and unavailable as a witness. Held:
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It was error to exclude the hospital record from evidence. Ribas v. Revere
Rubber Co., 91 At. Rep. 58 (R. I. 1914).
The court in this case proceeded on the theory that the record con-
sisted of entries made in the regular course of an occupation or business,
contemporaneously with the event recorded. By an exception to the hearsay
rule, such entries are admissible in evidence when the entrant is dead or
otherwise unavailable for testimony in court. . Doe v. Turford, 3 B. & Ad.
o (Eng. 1832) ; First Baptist Church v. Harper, i9 Mass. i96 (ipo6); Fran-
cis v. Perry, 144 N. Y. Supp. 167. (1913). The English courts require several
other factors to render the record admissible. There must be a duty to a
superior of keeping the record. The Queen v. Worth, 4 Q. B. 132 (Eng.
1843).. The duty must be to do the, very thing which the entry relates, and
then to make a report or record of it, at the exact time at which it was
actually recorded. Smith v. Blakey, L R. 2 Q. B. 332 (Eng. 1867). No
collateral facts recorded, but only the facts which there was a duty to record,
can be proved by the entries.- Chambers v. Birnasconi, I C. & J. 451 (Eng.
1831). The American doctrine is, in general, much more liberal than the
English rule, and does not insist on the requirements stated above. Weaver
v. Leiman, 52 Md. 7o8 (1879) ; Fisher v. Mayor, 67 N. Y. 73 (1876) ; Kennedy
v. Doyle, io Allen, 16x (Mass. 1865). The entries, however, must be sub-
stantially contemporaneous with the events recorded. Lane v. Hardware
Co., 121 Ala. 296 (1898); Bridgewater v. Roxbury, 54 Conn. 213 (1886).
Some courts require the facts entered to be within the entrant's personal
knowledge. Butchers' Ass'n v. Boston, 214 Mass. 254 (1913); Chaffee v.
U. S., i8 Wall. S16 (U. S. x873). Other courts admit the record in con-
nection with the testimony of the person who .ctually observed the facts
and reported them to the entrant. Mayor v. R. R., 102 N. Y. 572 (1886) ; Stet-
tauer v. White, 98 Ill. 72 (1881). Still others admit the record without
requiring the testimony of the observer. Hitchner Co. v. Penna. R- Co., 158
Fed. Rep. Ion (igog) ; Insurance Co. v. R. R., 138 N. C. 42 (1905).
EVIDENCE-OTHER OFFENCEs-In a prosecution for polygamy, the evi-
dence showed that the defendant, after living with the plural wife for a
few days, disappeared with her jewelry. Held: Evidence that the defendant
stole the jewelry from tle plural wife, while living with her, was admis-
sible to show motive for the crime charged. State v. Von Klein, 142 Pac.
Rep. 549 (Ore. 1914).
Although all the cases are in accord with the final decision in the prin-
cipal case. there are two different theories advanctd to support the decisions.
One theory, which is that adopted by Mr. Wigmore, proceeds upon the funda-
mental principle of evidence that all facts affording any reasonable infer-
ence as to the act charged are relevant and admissible, including facts show-
ing design, motive, knowledge, or the like, where these matters are in issue
or relevant. That the facts offered consist of past criminal misconduct is
immaterial. Nor does the admission of such criminal misconduct conflict
with the character rule that conduct tending and offered to show had moral
character is inadmissible as evidence. Evidence offered for such purpose is
excluded not because of its criminality, but because of its irrelevancy, the
English evidence law rule being that matter whose only probative value lies
in its similarity to the act under consideration, is irrelevant. Hence past
conduct, offered to show motive, is relevant and admissible as evidence,
whether or not such conduct was criminal. I Wigmore on Evidence, §216;
State v. Lapage. s N. H. 245 (x876). However, where the facts offered are
both irrelevant and criminal, there is an additional reason for exclusion,
since the criminal facts would prejudice the cause of the accused. State v.
Saunders, 14 Ore. 300 (1886). Y I
The other theory rests upon a general rule 'of criminal evidence that, on
the trial of a person accused of crime, proof of a distinct, independent offense
is inadmissible. This rule is, however, subject to numerous exceptigils.
People v. Molineux, i68 N. Y. 264 (i9oi); Shaffner v. Com., 72 Pa. 6o
(1872); People v. Cunningham, 66 Cal. 668 (188.5). So evidence of the com-
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mission of another offense is admissible when it tends to show design or
place, Wallace v. State, 41 Fla. 547 (1899); knowledge, People v. Hennsler,
48 Mich. 49 (1882) ; intent, Curtis v. State, 78 Ala. 12 (x885) ; motive, Thomp-
son v. U. S., 144 Fed. Rep. i4 (Mass. i9o6); identity, State v. Breton. 66
Tenn. 138 (1874). For cases and a general discussion of this theory, see
People v. Molineux, 62 L. R. A. z93 and note. Mr. Wigmore contends that
this general rule has no ground for existence, but is based upon an erroneous
conception of the character-rule, viz., that the rejection of past misconduct
under that rule is due simply to the circumstance that it is misconduct, and
that, therefore, all misconduct should be rejected. I Wigmore on Evidence,
§216. It does not appear upon which theory the principal case was decided.
EViDENcE-RES GF.sTA-An injured person recovering consciousness in a
hospital after an accident told his mother why he was in a dangerous posi-
tion and the mother offers this statement to show that at the time of the
accident her son was acting within the scope of his employment. Held: This
was not a necessary incident of the litigated act. necessary in the sense that
it is part of the preparations for or emanations trom that act. Hobbs v.
Great Northern Ry. Co., 142 Pac. Rep. 20 (Wash. 1914).
Res geslae presupposes a main fact or principal transaction and the res
gestae mean the circumstances, facts and declarations which grow out of the
nain fact, are contemporaneous with it and seem to illustrate its character,
Ilermis v. Chicago & G. N. Ry., 8o Wis. 59o (i89i). Statement was made
at the time and in view of the happening and seems to have grown directly
out of the happening and was made immediately after it, hence it was part
of the res gestae. Hanover R. R. v. Coyle, 55 Pa. 396 (1867). The true test
is whether the declaration is a verbal act, illustrating, explaining or inter-
preting other parts of the transaction of which it is itself a part or whether
merely history or part of the history of a completed past affair. McMahon
v. Chicago Ry. Co., 239 Ill. 334 (igo9). There seem to be two common ele-
ments in all these statements; contemporaneity and spontaneity. The statement
may not be separated in time and must depend on the act. The statement
must be contemporaneous. Keifer v. Life Insurance Co., 2ox Pa. 448 (1902) ;
Kyner v. Mining Co., 184 Fed. 43 (i91o). As to the interpretation of the
word contemporaneous, Rex v. Bedingfield, 14 Cox C. C. 341 (i879), is the
leading authority for a strict interpretation of the rule, and Insurance Co. v.
Mosley, 8 Wall. 397 (1869), for a rather loose interpretation. American cases
have also recognized a sort of psychological contemporaneity. Sc the first
statements of the injured party after regaining consciousness are treated as
contemporaneous with the act itself since there was no action of the brain
of the injured party in the meantime. Christopherson v. Chicago . R., iog
N. W. Rep. 1077 (Ia. 1go6). The length of the period of unconsciousness is
immaterial. In one case the statement was made eight days after the acci-
dent, but a minute or two after the injured party first became conscious.
Britton v. Washington Water Co., 59 Wash. 440 (i910). Intense suffering,
such as to make it improbable for the injured party to do any deliberation, has
had the same effect as unconsciousness in making the statement psychologically
contemporaneous. Smith v. Stoner, '243 Pa. 57 (1914). The statement must
be spontaneous as well as contemporaneous. Savannah R. IR v. Holland, 82
Ga. 257 (1888) ; Pledges v. Chicago R. R., 69 Neb. 456 (1903). The inability
of an unconscious man to deliberate insures spontaneity of statements imme-
diately upon regaining consciousness.
An examination of cases distinguishing between statements which are
.part of res geslae and those which are mere narrative tends to show that the
distinction is rather in the circumstances surrounding the making of the utter-
ance than in the subject matter of the statements themselves. Vaughan v. St.
Louis Ry. Co., 164 S. W. Rep. 144 (Mo. 1914); Hill v. Aetna Ins. Co., 63 S. E.
Rep. i24 (N. C. i9o8). Where an injured man had time to deliberate, but
being a deaf mute, could not communicate his thoughts for half an hour. it
was held that statements then made were inadmissible, XVadele v. New York
Central. g4 N. Y. 274 (1884).
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Gin's-CHILD AS Stnmcjr oF GinT-A mother gave her child, immediately
after its birth, to defendant. Some months later she demanded it back, but
defendant refused to give it up, claiming it was a gift and irrevocable. Held:
In no sense can a child be considered as subject matter for an absolute and
irrevocable gift. Harrison v. Harker, i42 Pacif. Rep. 716 (Utah, 1914).
An agreement by which a parent surrenders the custody of his child is
not binding and he is at liberty to revoke this consent and obtain the child
by habeas corpus. In re Scarritt. 76 Mo. 58. (1882). Persons who take over
children do not acquire an absolute right such as parents have, but merely
a right secondary to the natural right of the parents, and the gift of the
child by the parents, of itself and standing alone, cannot make their right
superior to that of the parents. Chapsley v. Wood, 26 Kans. 652 (i881).
Hence when a controversy arises between such parties, custody of the child
will be assigned to the persons having the legal right unless it appears that
they are improper persons to take care of the child. Rust v. Vanacter. 9 W.
Va. 6oe (1876); Commonwealth v. Briggs, i6 Pick. 2o3 (Mass. 1835); Her-
rick v. Richardson, 40 N. H. 272 (i6o).
JUDGMFNT-RES AvJUDICATA-A judgment in x civil suit, dependenz'or
its determination on the establishment of facts amounting to a crime, for the
commission of which the person is later indicted and acquitted, is a bar to
an action for malicious prosecution of the criminal charge, in that the plain-
tiff in the last suit is estopped to deny the commission of the acts and his guilt
in committing them. So when action is brought on an insurance policy and
the insurance company wins on the defense that the insured set fire to the
premises, but later the insured is acquitted of tle charge of arson, yet the
judgment in the action on the policy is conclusive as between the parties as to
his guilt and no action for malicious prosecution can lie. Turner v. Columbia
Insurance Co., 147 N. W. Rep. 114 (Neb. 1914).
At first glance it would seem proper for the court to have counterbal-
anced the adverse judgment and the acquittal and allowed the parties to
litigate the question from the beginning, but all the cases show that so far
as malicious prosecution is concerned the results of conviction and acquittal
are decided on totally different grounds. Conviction is conclusive evidence
of probable cause. Oppenheimer v. Manhattan Railway Co., j8 N. Y. Supp.
411 (1892); Thick v. Washer, 137 Mich. 155 (i9o4). And this is true
although the conviction might be reversed by a higher court. Francisco v.
Schmielk, i56 App. Div. 335 (N. Y. 191.3); McElroy v. Catholic Press Co.,
i6.s Ill. App. 290 (ioii). Acquittal must be shown before action of malicious
prosecution can be brought, but is not conclusive as to cases of probable
cause. Hanowitz v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 122 Minn. 24t (1913); Eslaule
v. Higgins, i59 Mo. App. 177 (91i); in fact, an acquittal is not even prima
facie evidence of lack of probable cause, Price v. Singer -Sewing Machine Co,
142 N. W. Rep. 377 (Mich. 1913).
Does the judgment in the civil suit have the same effect as a conviction?
Independently of malice and probable cause, it has been held that proof of
actual guilt of the plaintiff of the crime of which he was acquitted is a good
defense to an action for maliciou3 prosecution of the plaintiff for that crime
Threefoot v. Nuckals, 68 Miss. xi6 (i89o); Thucher v. Building & Loan
Asso., 118 N. C. 129 (1896). There is a-Pennsylvania case which stands for
the same proposition, but it is robbed of much of its force by the incidental
mention of the fact that the defendant in the malicious prosecution suit was
aware of the facts establishing plaintiff's guilt, although he was unable to
procure conviction. Ruffner v. Hooks, 2 Pa. Super. Ct. 278 (t896). -A former
judgment between two parties binds them as to all matters on the determi-
nation of which the judgment in the former suit depended, although the
second suit is on a different cause 6f action. Cromwell v. Sac County. 94
U. S. 35i (1874), followed in Stokes v. Foote, 172 N. Y. 327 (I9o2), and
Union Life Insurance Co. v. Drake, 214 Fed. Rep. 536 (1914). As between
the parties to the action in the principal case then, the plaintiff is estopped
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to deny that he committed the acts and thus having admitted that there was
itch" a judgment against him. the face of the pleadings show his guilt, which
is a defense and judgment'on demurrer was properly for defendant.
JURORS-C-IALLENGr-An erroneous overruling of a challenge for cause is
rint ground for reversal, even though the peremptory challenges are there-
after exhausted, unless it be further shown that an objettionable juror was
forced upon the challenging party after he had exhausted his peremptory chal-
lenges. Colbert v. Joural Pub. Co., 1 Pac. Rep. 146 (N. M. 1914).
This case 'is in accord with the view adopted in most jurisdictions that
even where peremptory challenges are exhausted, unless an objectionable
juror was forced upon the challenging party, the verdict will not be dis-
turbed. Scragg v. Sallee, 140 Pac. Rep. 706 (Cal. 1914); Spies v. People,
122 11. (1887) ; Johns v. State. 55 Md. 35o (x88o). Many jurisdictions, how-
ever, adopt the contrary view, holding that such refusal is ground for reversal,
when appellant exhausts all his pereniptory challenges before the jury is
drawn. State v. Brown, i5 Kan. 4oo (1875); Tramway Co. v. Carson, 123
Pac. Rep. 68o (Colo. 1012). The reason given for the decisions in the latter
cases is that the practical result of the disallowance of a challenge for cause
is to reduce the number of peremptory challenges to which appellant is
by law entitled, which error may be seriously prejudicial to him, It is quite
uniformly held that the erroneous overruling of a challenge for cause is a
"harmless" error, where the appellant does not use all of his peremptory
challernges, and especially if the juror objected to is subsequently dismissed
by a peremptory challenge. Burt v. Panjaud, 99 U. S. i8o (1878); Common-
wealth v. Fry, 198 Pa. 379 (xgoi); Thomson on Trials, voL i, §ixu. It has
been held that no obligation rests upon a party to use His peremptory ehal-
lenges to exclude a juror challenged for cause, and that the error is reversible.
Sampson v. Schaffer, 3 Cal. 107 (1853)e
LANDLORD AND TENANT-FORFEITURE-BANKRUpTCYc-A court of bank-
ruptcy acting in its equity jurisdiction, will not grant a petition of a lessor
to enforce forfeiture of a leasehold for breach of condition against bank-
ruptcy, since there is a solvent sub-tenant, agreeable to the lessor, using the
premises as prescribed by tht lessor, there having been no attempt on the part
of the bankrupt estate to get hold of the leasehold and dispose of it contrary
to lessor's wishes. In re Lackey, 214 Fed. Rep. 867 (19T4).
The sub-tenant is bound by the forfeiture by his lessor, the original
lessee, Eten v. Suysten, 6o N. Y. 252 (1875); Cushner v. Westlake, 43 Wash.
69o (i9o6). So also the act of the sub-tenant may give the original lessor
right to declare leasehold forfeited. Miller v. Prescott, 163 Mass. 12 (1895).
A provision for forfeiture in case of bankruptcy is valid. Hunter v. Gallins,
2 Term R. 133 (Eng. 178); Mitchinson v. Coates, 8 Term R. 57, 3oo (Eng.
I799). But, when he has equities, the sub-tenant may ask to be relieved from
forfeiture. Berney v. Moore, 2 Ridg. App. 31o (Eng. 1791). Equitv will not
ordinarily lend its aid to enforce a forfeiture. The parties are left to their
remedy at law. Bird v. Haw!.iiu, 58 N. J. Eq. 229 (1899); Wick v. Budin,
189 Pa. 83 (i89g). Exceptions have been made where the party seeking for-
feiture has special equities as in mining leases. Brown v. Vandergrift, 8o Pa.
142 (1875); Laurel Creek Coal Co. v. Browning, 99 Va. 528 (igoi). The
general American rule as to relief from forfeiture for breach of non-
pecuniary conditions that the iourts will -relieve against forfeiture if the
breach was caused by accident, mistake, etc., and there is no actual loss or
the loss is readily ascertainable in money. Martin v. Osborn, 146 Mass. 39
(z888) ; Henry v. Tupper, 29 Vt. 358 (1857). A court of bankruptcy has all
powers of a court of equity in dealing with questions before it.
It is interesting to note that, without a provision for forfeiture on bank-
ruptcy, bankruptcy or any disposition of the property under bankruptcy pro-
ceedings will not be deemed breach of a covenant not to assign. Farnum
v. Hepner, 79 Cal. 575 (1889); In re Bush, 126 Fed. Rep. 878 (io4). An
assignment for the benefit of creditors constituting an act of bankruptcy and
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hence void under bankruptcy proceedings has been held not to give rise toforfeiture. In re Bush, supra. Ir England, it has been held that such anassignment does work a forfeiture. Holland v. Cole, i Hurl. & C. 6 (Eng.1862). At the time this case was decided, such assignment did not constitutean act of bankruptcy and was perfectly valid.
MASTER AND SERVANT-TEs r FOR VicE-PRiNCIPAL-An employee of a com-pany was injured by the negligent act of his foreman. Disobedience toorders of the foreman would be followed by dismissal. Held: The fore-man was a vige-principal and the company was liable. Gussell v. ChampionFibre Co., -14 Fed. Rep: 963 (N. C. 1914).Though an employee injured by negligence of a fellow servant cannotrecover of his master, Railway Co. v. Surrells, 115 Ill. App. 615 (194o),an injured employee may recover of master for injuries resulting fromnegligence of a vice-principal. Harris v. Quarry Co., 49 S. E. Rep. 95(N. C. i9o4). In England, superior servants of a lower grade than generalmanager are not vice-principals. Wilson v. Merry, xg L. T. (N. S.) 30 (Eng.x868). Under American decisions the test whether an employee is a vice-principal or a fellow servant is not his title or rank, Railway Co. v. Doyle,5o Neb. 555 (1897), a power to employ or discharge, Banc v. Irvine, 172M7o. 317 (1903), hut the nature of services he performs.Pirce v. Oli- er
A1 
- • rc v. liver,47 N. E Rep. 485 (Ind. App. 1897). A mere foreman ii not a vice-principal.Anderson v. Winston, 3z Fed. Rep. 528 (U. S. 1887); Strange v. McCormick,5 Clark, io (Pa. 185o); contra, Egan v. Tucker, 18 Hun 347 (N. Y. x879).Under federal decisions neither mere superiority in rank, Railroad Co. v.Baugh, z49 U. S. 368 (z892), nor right to exercise control over other ser-vants, Railroad Co. v. Peterson, 162 U. S. 346 (1895), will make a servanta vice-principal. But it must be shown that he is intrusted by his masterwith departmental control, Moss v. Compress Co., 202 Fed. Rep. 657 (1913),and it is immaterial whether or not he has the power to employ and dis-chaige. Mining Co. v. Whelan, 12 C. C. A. 225 (1897). A mere foremanis converted into a vice-principal when he assumis to discharge the dutiestowards the workman which the law imposes upon the principal, Christ v.Power Co., 83 Pac. Rep. 199 (Kan. i9o5). Though the power of hiring anddischarging does not constitute a vice-principal, Casey v. Paving Co., 47 AtLRep. 1128 (Pa. i9oo), the absence of that power is conclusive against the.inference that a servant is a vice-principal. Bridge Co. v. Newberry, 96Pa. 246 (i88o). Under the "dual capacity doctrine" the master is liable forinjuries resulting to servant from the negligence of the vice-principal actingas such, Railroad Co. v. Atwell, 198 Ill. 200 (r9oa), but he is not liablefor injuries resulting from negligent act of vice-principle acting in thecapacity of a co-laborer. Ross v. Walker, 139 Pa. 5I (1b9i); Meehan v.Remington, 65 N. Y. Supp. mI16 (i9oo). Some states do not accept thisdoctrine. Stone Co. v. Kraft, 31 Ohio, 287 (1877); Light Co. v. Baldwin,62 Neb. i8o (19o). Whether a delinquent employee was a vice-principalis to be determined by the court where the facts show precisely the relationthe delinquent bore to the injured employee, Callan v. Bull, 45 Pac. Rep. 1017(Cal. 1896), by the jury when the relations of the delinquent to his sub-ordinates are left in doubt by the evidence. Mapes v. Packing Co., 3z Pa.Super. Ct. 453 (zgo6).
NEGLIGENcE-TnEATRE.A spectator at a theatre was injured through theproprietor's failure to keep a guard rail around the orchestra pit of histheatre. Held: The proprietor of a theatre is bound to use ordinary care anddiligence to put and keep his place in safe condition. Failure to keep aguard rail around the orchestra pit was actionable negligence. New Theatrev. Hartlove, go Atl. Rep. 9W (Md. 1914).This is in accord with the well established rule. The proprietor of atheatre is not liable as the insurer of persons attending performances, Dun-ning v. Jacobs, 36 N. Y. Supp. 453 (i895), but a person erecting or main-taining a place of public exhibition assumes the obligation of using all pos-
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sible care to provide for the safety of those who come there, Agricultural
& Mechanical Ass'n v. Gray, 1i8 Md. 6oo (1912), and if he neglects his duty
so that the hall is, in fact, unsafe, his knowledge or ignorance of the defect
is immaterial. Currier v. Boston Music Hall Ass'n, 135 Mass. 414 (1883).
So when the stairway of a grandstand at a race-track fell and injured the
plaintiff, it was held that defendant was bound to know that the structure
was safe or at least exercise the highest possible degree of care to that end,
the collapse of the structure being sufficient prima facie evidence of negli-
gence. Fox v. Buffalo Park, 47 N. Y. Supp. 788 (1897). The charging of
admission carries with it an implied warranty that due care has been used
by the defendant. Francis v. Cockrell, L. R. 5 Q. B. 184 (i87o). And the
defendant is not relieved from liability by the fact that other patrons of the
theatre contributed to bring about plaintiff's injury, as where a crowd of
spectators pressed against a defective railing causing it to break whereby
plaintiff fell and was injured. Schofield v. Wood, 17o Mass. 415 (1898). In
other words the duty of care that rests on proprietors of theatres and show
houses is an affirmative one and is only satisfied by evidence of positive care.
PNINCIrAL AND AGENT-RATriCATION-An insurance company's soliciting
agent, contrary to the provisions of the policy, received from the insured, a
promissory note in lieu of cash for the first premium. The policy was issued
and delivered and the amount of the premium was charged by the company
to the general agent, who in turn charged the soliciting agent. The soliciting
agent negotiated the note and absconded with the proceeds. Held: The jury
were warranted in finding that the action of the agent was ratified by the
delivery of the policy and the fact that it allowed the insured to retain it for
several months up to his death. Cranston v. West Coast Life Insurance Co.,
142 Pac. Rep. 762 (Ore. 1914).
Ordinarily, ratification of an agent's act is a mere matter of intention.
Brown v. Henry, 172 Mass. 559 (899). The act of an agent may be ratified
either by words or conduct of his principal. indicating an intention to adopt
the act as his own. Osborne v. Durham, 72 S. E. Rep. 849 (N. C. igir).
Thus, knowingly accepting the benefits of a transaction indicates the intention
of the principal to ratify the unauthorized act of his agent. Haney School
District Co. v. Hightower Baptist Institute, 113 Ga. 289 (Igox). An essential
element of ratification is that the principal have knowledge of all the
material facts of the transaction. Beacon Trust Co. v. Souther, 183 Mass.
413 (19o3); Thompson v. Murphy, 6o W. Va. 42 (19o6). But the principal
cannot -.urposely or wilfully shut his eyes to means of information and seek
to retain the benefits of the act and at the same time repudiate the act.
Johnson i% Ogren, io2 Minn. 8 (1907). The silence of a principal, after
receiving notice of the agent's unauthorized act, may be a fact to be weighed
on the issue of whether the principal ratified the act. Ratification by the
principal on this ground is based upon the doctrine of equitable estoppel in
that the principal has behaved in such a .vay that the party dealing with the
agent would be injured if the transaction were repudiated. St. Louis, Gun-
ning Advertising Co. v. Wanamaker & Brown, go S. W. 737 (Mo. 1905).
Whether mere silence of a principal and failure to repudiate his agent's
act within a reasonable time after knowledge thereof, amounts to ratification
is a question for the jury. Fifth National Bank v. Iron City National Bank,
92 Tex. 436 (8).
Pi0CEnURE-FExEctirroNs--TuST EST.TE-A julguent creditor of the
ce$suis que trust under a marriage settlement may seize trust chattels on a
fieri facias, where the whole of the equitable and beneficial interest in the
chattels is vested in the judgment debtors. Stevens v. Hince, 1io Law Times,
935 (Eng. 1914).
At common law, the equitable interests of a debtor were not subject to
execution under a fieri facis, but could be reached only in equity. Scott v.
Scholer, 8 East, 467 (Eng. i8o7); Cadogan v. Kennett, 2 Cowp. 432 (Eng.
1776). Section 1o of the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. IJ, C. 3), which made
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the interest of a cestui que trust in lands, tenements, and hereditaments
liable to execution, did not extend to personal property. Hence the principal
case seems to mark an advance in the English law on the subject. In
the United States, however, most jurisdictions, by statutes of varying effect,
allow equitable estates and interests to be taken on execution. KennedyV v.
Nunan, 52 Cal. 326 (1877) ; Whiteford v. Hootman, zo4 I1l. App. 562 (1902) ;
Demuth v. Kemp, 115 N. Y. Supp. 28 (i9o9); Robertson v. Howard, 82 Kan.
-588 (101o). Some states have arrived at the same result without statute.
Flanagin v. Daws, 2 Houst. 476 (Del. 1862); Atwater v: Manchester Bank,
45 Minn. 341 (i8gi); Anwerter v. Mathiot, 9 S. & R. 397 (Pa. 1823). A few
inrisdictions follow the common law doctrines, and exempt equitable inter-
ests from legal execution. Lee v. Enos, 97 Mich. 276 (1893) ; Starr v. U. S,
8 App. D. C. 552 (x8g6) ; Tischler v. Robinson, s6 Fla. 699 -(I9O8).
The common law rule was sustained by the theory that at law only
legal interests could be recognized and enforced. It was not founded on any
tenderness for equitable titles, but rather upon a desire to ignore them alto-
gether. By proceedings in equity, equitable interests could always be made
to contribute to the satisfaction of a judgment against the owner. The
modern American procedure, by allowing such interests to be taken under
fieri faias, obviates the necessity of a separate suit by the creditor, while
it retains all the advantages thereof. Freeman on Executions, Vol. 1, §zx6
(Ed. i900).
PROP.RrTY-AovrasE Poss ssI0 -RIGHT OF WAY-A railroad acquired land
for its roadbed under condemnation proceedings, which were void as to
some of the owners who were not made parties. Title was claimed under
the order of confirmation and the railroad had full possession of the premises
for forty-five years. The question arose as to whether this uninterrupted use
for so long a period of time had given the railroad title to the land or
simply an easement. Held: A claim to the rightful possession of land under
such an easement is clearly hostile to the fee owners, and is the assertion
of a title which adverse possession will render unassailable. Long Island
R. Co.,v. Mulry, io5 N. E. Rep. 8o6 (N. Y. 1814).
A claim of ownership to establish title by adverse possession must be
hostile to the owner of the fee. Hawk v. Senseman, 6 S. & R. 21 (Pa. i82o).
Thus, claims to title under a lease, Bedell v. Shaw, 59 N. Y. 46 0874); by
tenant atwill, Wheeling, etc., Ry. v. Cleland, 37 L. I. 466 (Pa. 1879); by
mortgagee in possession or purchaser of tax lease, Gross v. Wellwood, 9o
N. Y. 638 (1882), are all insufficient as bases to claims for title by adverse
possession. Such permissive possession cannot change to adverse possession
without some evidence of ouster, Nicolai v. Baltimore, ioo Md. 579 (905).
There must be some unequivocal act so done as to leave no doubt in the
minds of the jury that it was brought to the knowledge of the true owner.
Hood v. Hood, 2 Gr. 229 (Pa. 1858).
An easement is a privilege in land existing distinct from the ownership
of the soil. Pierce v. Keaton. 70 N. Y. 419 (1877). It is the right which
one may exercise in or on the estate of another. Reeve v. Dwyer, 144 App.
Div. 647 (N. Y. 19oi). A railroad, by proper condemnation proceedings,
acquires a permanent easenent in land. Roby v. N. Y. C. & H. R. Ry., x4a
N. Y. 176 (894) Had the proceedihgs in the principal case been regular
and all owners of the land made parties thereto, the railroad would have
acquired an easement in accordance with this rule. Nothing having passed
by condemnation, the question arose as to what rights the railroad had
acquired by adverse user. That there is room for reasonable doubt in such
a situation is shown by the opinion in Scheer v. Long Island R. R. Co., iii
N. Y. Supp. s69 (19o8), where it was said that possession was not under
claim of title, but only of a use or easement in the land.
PROPERTY-BAILMNENT-DENIAL OF Timra-An owner of grain deposited it
with a warehouseman. and received a receipt for same. Afterwards the
depositor presented his receipt and demanded grain. The warehouseman
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refused to deliver it. claiming that the depositor was not the true owner and
that lie had delivered the grain to the *rue owner. Held: A bailee cannot deny
the title of the bailor and the depositor may recover damages. Street v. Ele-
vator Co., 146 N. W. Rep. 1077 (S. D. T914).
At early common law a bailee under no circumstances could set up the
defense of title in himself or in a third party, in an action by bailor for
recovery of goods bailed. 9 Henry 6. 58 (431); Krause v. Com., 93 Pa.
8j8 (z88o). Under the modern doctrine the bailor niay set up only two.
defences for non-delivery to the bailee: that the true owner recovered the'
goods by legal proceedings, Bliven v. Railroad Co., 36 N. Y. A.o3 (z86i);"
Burton v. Wilkinson, 18 Vt. i86 (846) ; or that the hailee delivered property-
to the true owner on his demand. King v. Richards, 6 Whart. 418 (Pa. i84o);
The Idaho, 93 U. S. 575 (1876). In the latter instance, the bailee takes the
risk, Pepper v. James, 67 S. E. Rep. 218 (Ga. igio), and has the burden of
showing that the person to whom he surrendered the property was the true
owner. Transp. Co. v. Barber, 56 N. Y. s44 (x888). To preserve his own
possession a bailee cannot deny the title of his bailor, Railway Co. v. Spires,
I Ga. App. 22 (1907), neither by asserting title in himself, Thompson v.
Williams, 30 Kan. 114 (1883), nor in a third person. Sinclair v. Murphy, 14
Mich. 392 (1866). A bailee is not estopped from showing that subsequent
to the bailment title was acquired by bailee, Shellhouse v. Field, 97 N. E.
Rep. 94o (Ind. App. 1912); or by a third person, Roberts v. Noyes, -6 Me.
59o (x885), or that title was conveyed to a third person in trust for bailee.
Burnett v. Fulton, 48 N. C. 486 (1856). That bailee had been compelled by
legal action, of which bailor had notice, to pay to true owner for property
is a valid defense to an action by bailor. Cook v. Holt, 48 N. Y. 275 (1872).
The bailee may assert a lien on the property. Burdict v. Murray, 3 Vt. 302
(183o).
SALES-WARRANTY-EFFCT oF DEscRIuroN-A vendor made a written
description of a certain thoroughbred colt which he had for sale. It was
claimed that this amounted to a warranty that the animal was as described;
therefore since the colt did not conform to the description, that the vendee
might keep him and recover for breach of warranty. Held: This was no
express warranty but rather a condition precedent that the colt should be
-is described, and since the vendee accepted the colt and, though dissatisfied
with him, expressed his readiness to pay for him, he was estopped from
later claiming damages for failure on the part of the vendor to comply with the
description. Brown v. Davidson, 142 Pac. Rep. 387 (Okl. 1914).
Because of the different liability which attaches it is necessary to decide
whether a particular engagement of the seller is an essential part of the con-
tract of sale and therefore a condition, or is a collateral matter and there-
fore a warranty. Words of description are generally not considered as a
warranty, but merely as a condition precedent to any liability on the part
of the buyer. This is because the qualities described are necessary to the
identity of the thing sold, and if as the colt does not correspond to the
description, the vendee is not obliged to pay for what he did not agree to
buy. Brown v. Baird, 5 Ok. 133 (1897); Patrick v. Lombard Co., 8I Neb.
267 (igo8); Shambaugh v. Current, ii Ia. 121 (xgoo) ; Carleton v. Ayres &
Co., 149 N. Y. 137 (s8g6). It has been said as a general proposition thatdescriptive statements constitute a warranty whether the seller makes them
or the buyer in ordering the goods makes them. 21 H. L. R. 563 (igo8).
Yet this is largely true only in cases where particular goods are known
generally under certain descriptive trade names. Henderson Elevator Co. v.
Milling Co., 126 Ga. 279 (igo6) ; Abel v. Murphy, 43 N. Y. Misc. 648 (x9o4);
Hoffman v. Dixon, 105 Wis. 315 (x0oo).
TORTs-LIABILITY FOR Vicious DoG KEPT ON PREMIsES-A vicious dog
owned and controlled by a seventeen-year-old girl but kept on the premises
of her father, with whom she lived, escaped and killed another dog. Held:
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The father is not liable since his daughter, who, though not sul juris was of
rc.sponsible age, controlled the dog. North v. Wood, 1o Law Times, 703
(Eng. 1914).
It has been long well settled both in England and America that he who
keeps a dog known to be vicious does so at his peril, and is liable without
procf of negligence for harm caused by its escape. Laverone v. Mangianti,
41 Cal. 138 (1871); Sanders v. Teape, 51 L T. 263 (Eng: 1884); Shaw v.
Craft, 37 Fed. Rep. 317 (1888): Sylvester v. Maag, i55 Pa. 225 (1893). Even
the necessity of proving scicnter has been abolished in England and in many
states by statute. St. 28-29 Vict., C. 60 (Eng.) ; Mass. Rev. Sts., c. 58, §113;
Brewer v. Crosby, 177 Mass. 29 (T858); Newton v. Cardon, 72 Mich. 642
(1888). The gist of the action is the keeping or harboring of the dog, and
ownership is immaterial. ldcKone v. Wood, 5 C. & P. 2 (Eng. x83i) ; Keenan
v. Gutta Percha Mfg. Co., 46 Hun 545 (N. Y. 1887); Snyder v. Patterson,
161 Pa. 98 "(z894). The cases are in some confusion as to what constitutes
"keeping or harboring" as required by the rule. All jurisdictions agree that
the casual presence of a dog on the premises does not render the occupier
thereof lable as the "o-vner or keeper" within the meaning of the law. Sproat
v. Directors of the Poor, 145 Pa. 598 (1892); O'Donnell v. Pollock, 170
Mass. 441 (1898). So also it is settled that one who has actual possession
and control of another's dog on his own premises is liable as the keeper.
Barrett v. Malden Ry. Co., 3 Allen, iot (Mass. i86x); Quilty v. Battie, 135
N. Y. 20! (1892). Where the owner of property allows another to keep a
dog on the premises, though he himself may exercise no control over it,
some courts hold him liable on the ground that he should not have permitted
the dog to be kept by anyone on his premises. McKone v. Wood, supra;
The Lord Derby, 17 Fed. Rep. 265 (1883); MeAdams v. Starr, 974 Conn.
85 (i9o1). Other courts put the emphasis upon the amount of control and
hold that the mere fact that the owner of premises permits another to keep
a vicious dog upon them, does not of itself make the owner of the premises
the "keeper" of the dog. This rule depends largely on the age, employment,
and home of the real owner, and all the circumstances of the particular case.
Snyder v. Patterson, -supra; McCasker v. Weatherbee, 1oo Me. 25 (19o5).
The fact that others shared with the defendant in the control of the dog is
immaterial. Grant v. Ricker, 74 Me. 487 (1883); Lettes v. Harning, 22 N.
Y. Supp. 565 (1893) ; Hayes v. Smith, is Ohio Cir. Ct., 30o (x898).
TORTs-VIcious DossEsTic ANIMALS-A stockman, while driving a bull,
which he had purchased, from the seller's inclosure, was attacked by the
bull, thrown from his horse and killed. It appeared that the seller knew the
bull was vicious. Held: The owner or keeper of a vicious animal, who knows
of its propensity to do mischief, is liable for any injury it may inflict; the
seller here is liable. Gunderson v. Bieren, 142 Pac. Rep. 685 (Wash. 1914).
This decision is in accord with the generally accepted doctrine that if
the animal is vicious, and tie owner knew it, ie is accountable for any injury
done by it without proof of negligence in restraining the animal. The gist
of the action is not negligence in keeping tie animal but the keeping him
with knowledge of his vicious propensity, and the keeper is liable regard-
less of his endeavors to prevent mischief. Muller v. McKesson, 73 N. Y.
195 (1878) ; Harris v. Carstens Packing Co., 86 Pac. Rep. 1125 (Wash. i9o6);
Gordon v. Kaufman, 89 N. E. Rep. 898 (Ind. igo). In a few jurisdictions,
however, it is held that the gist of the action is the negligent failure properly
to restrain the animal and that, consequently, the defendant may relieve him-
self from liability by showing due care in restraining the animal. Worthen
v. Love, 60 Vt. 285 (888) ; DeGray v. Murray, 69 N. J. L, 458 (19o3). The
sufficiency of the keeper's knowledge of the vicious propensity of the animal
is a question of what is sufficient to convince a man of ordinary prudence of
its inclination to commit injuries of the class complained of. Reynolds v.
ITussey. 64 N. H. 64 (186). The defendant is not excused from liability by
the fact tlat the anilial has never actually injurcd anyone before. Rider v.
White, 65 N. Y. s4 (1875); Slatter v. Sorge, 131 N. W. Rep. 565 (Mich.
RECEXT CASES
iq ). While bound to notice the general propensities of the class to which
the animal belongs, the keeper is not bound to guard against some disposition
of the animal different from the species generally, in the absence of notice
thereof. Domm v. Hollenbeck, 259 I1. 382 (1913).
TorTs-UaREiSTFRED MOTORCYCLE IN Hic.nwAY-While plaintiff was rid-
ing a motorcycle on a public street, he was struck and injured by an auto-
mobile negligently operated by the defendant. Plaintiff had not registered his
motorcycle in accordance with a city ordinance making it unlawful for unreg-
istered motorcycles to be operated or the highway. Held: Plaintiff can
recover. Yahachi Shimoda v. Bundy, 142 Pac. Rep. iog (Cal. 1914).
The court in this case refused to follow the Massachusetts rule laid down
in the case of Dudley v. Northampton Ry., 2o2 Mass. 443 (i9o), where
under a statute similar to that in the principal case it was held that one
operating an unlicensed automobile could recover only for wanton or wilful
injury. More recent cases in Massachusetts adhere strictly to the rule laid
down in the Dudley case and allow no recovery. Compton v. Williams, 103
N. E. Rep. 298 (Mass. 1913); Dean v. Boston Ry. Co., io5 N. E. Rep. 616
(Mass. i9r4). With this rule Bortner v. York Ry. Co., 22 Pa. Dist. Rep. 84
(1913), is also in accord. Even in Massachusetts, however, in applying
another and similar section of the same statute, which required operators of
automobiles to secure licenses, the court was unwilling to extend the doctrine
of Dudley v. Northampton Ry., supra, and allowed recovery. Bourne v.
Whitman, 2og Mass. x55 (igir). The general rule undoubtedly is that unless
the violation of an ordinance bears a causal relation or contributes to the
injuries sustained, the fact that plaintiff violated it does not bar recovery.
Newcomb v. Boston Protective Dept., 146 Mass. 596 (88) ; and many juris-
dictions, adhering to this rule, hold with the principal case that unless the
violation contributes to the accident, plaintiff can recover. Hemming v. New
Haven, 74 Ad. Rep. 892 (Conn. x9io); Switzer v. Sherwood, 141 Pac. Rep.
181 (Wash. 19r4); see also 62 U. oF P. L. R. 216; 61 U. oF P. L. R. 346.
,VORKMEN'S COMPENSATON - OccuPATOxAL DisEAsE-The Michigan
Workmen's Compensation Act provides compensation "for the accidental
injury to, or death of, employes." A workman died .as a result of lead
poisoning, contracted in the course of his employment. Held: Diseases of
gradual growth, though caused by the conditions of the enploy ent, are not
within the purview of the act. Adams v. Acme White Lead and Color
Works, 148 N. W. Rep. 485 (Mich. 914).Whether workmen contracting occupational diseases are entitled to com-
pensation depends largely upon the wording of the particular statute. Wherethe word "injury" lone is used in the act, recovery is allowed for diseases
of gradual growth. In re Hurle, xo4 N. F. Rep. 336 (Mass. xgs4) ; Plasko v.
Xmerican Carriage Co., 15 Nisi Prius (N. S.), 273 (Ohio, 1914). On the.ther hand, where, as in the English acts, the phrase "injury by accident";s used, workmen who stffer from occupational diseases cannot claim com-
pensation. Coe v. The Fife Coal Co., 46 Scot. L Rep. 328 (igog); Eke v.
llIart-Dyke, 2 K. B. 677 (Eng. i9io). But if the disease is the result of anaccident, the date of which can be definitely fixed, it comes within the scope
of the English statutes. Brintons." Ltd., v. Turvey. App. Cas. 230 (Eng.
1905) ; Kelly v. Achenlea Coal Co., 48 Scot. L. Rep. 768 (5955). The authori-ties have hitherto recognized a distinction between the terms "injury by
accident" and "*accidental injury." See Lord Macaghten in Fenton v. Thor-
Icy, i9 T. L R. 684 (Eng. 19o3), and 25 H. L. R. 329- In the principal case,however, the court considers the two phases as identical, basing its decision
on the authority of the English cases cited above, particularly Steel v. Cam-
mell, Laird and Co., 2 i B. 232 (Eng. 1905). For further discussion of this
subject see Bradury's Workman's Compensation, Vol. i, p. 339 (Ed. 1914),
aid the article by the same author in 62 U. o P. L. R. 329.
